We study the problem of finding solutions to the stable matching problem that are robust to errors in the input and we obtain a polynomial time algorithm for a special class of errors. In the process, we also initiate work on a new structural question concerning the stable matching problem, namely finding relationships between the lattices of solutions of two "nearby" instances.
Introduction
Ever since its introduction in the seminal 1962 paper of Gale and Shapley [GS62] , the stable matching problem has been the subject of intense study from numerous different angles in many fields, including computer science, mathematics, operations research, economics and game theory, e.g., see the books [Knu97, GI89, Man13] . The very first matching-based market, namely matching medical interns to hospitals, was built around this problem, e.g., see [GI89, Rot16] . Eventually, this led to an entire inter-disciplinary field, namely matching and market design [Rot16] . The stable matching problem and market design were the subject of the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics, awarded to Roth and Shapley [RS12] .
Another topic that has been extensively studied is the design of algorithms that produce robust solutions, e.g., see the books [CE06, BTEGN09] . Yet, there is a paucity of results at the intersection of these two topics. Indeed, we are aware of only two works [ABG + 16, ABF + 17]; see Section 1.2 for a detailed description of these works. As explained there, their notion of robustness of a stable matching solution is quite distinct from ours. Our first contribution is a combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for finding a robust stable matching for a special case of allowable errors in the input. Our second contribution is to initiate work on a new structural question, namely finding relationships between the lattices of solutions of two "nearby" instances of stable matching.
We note that a particularly impressive aspect of the stable matching problem is its deep and pristine combinatorial structure. This in turn has led to efficient algorithms for numerous questions studied about this problem, e.g., see the books mentioned above. In studying the new structural question, we have restricted ourselves to "nearby" instances which differ in only one agent's preference list. Clearly, this is only the tip of the iceberg as far as "nearby" instances go. Moreover, the structural results are so clean and extensive -see also our followup paper [MV18] -that they are likely to find algorithmic applications beyond the problem of finding robust solutions. In particular, with ever more interesting matching-based markets being designed and launched on the Internet [Rot16] , these new structural properties could find interesting applications and are worth studying further.
We will introduce our version of the problem of finding robust stable matchings via the following model: Alice has an instance A of the stable matching problem, over n boys and n girls, which she sends it to Bob over a channel that can introduce errors. Let B denote the instance received by Bob. Let D denote a polynomial sized domain from which errors are introduced by the channel; we will assume that the channel introduces at most one error from D. We are also given the discrete probability distribution, p over D, from which the channel picks one error. In addition, Alice sends to Bob a matching, M, of her choice, that is stable for instance A. Since M consists of only O(n) numbers of O(log n) bits each, as opposed to A which requires O(n 2 ) numbers, Alice is able to send it over an error-free channel. Now Alice wants to pick M in such a way that it is stable for instance A and has the highest probability of being stable for the instance B received by Bob. Hence she picks M from the set arg max
We will say that such a matching M is robust. We seek a polynomial time algorithm for finding such a matching.
Clearly, the domain of errors, D, will have to be well chosen to solve this problem. A natural set of errors is simple swaps, under which the positions of two adjacent boys in a girl's list, or two adjacent girls in a boy's list, are interchanged. We will consider a generalization of this class of errors, which we call upward shift. For a girl g, assume her preference list in instance A is {.
. .}, and let B denote the resulting instance. Then we will say that B is obtained from A by an upward shift. An analogous operation is defined on a boy b's list. The domain D consists of all such upward shifts on each boy's and each girl's list. Clearly, |D| is O(n 3 ), i.e., it is polynomially bounded. As will be clarified later, the operation of downward shift is much harder to deal with and we leave it as an open problem; see the Remark at the end of Section 4. In the rest of the paper, we will shorten "upward shift" to simply "shift". Let us also clarify that we will deal with the generalization of stable matching in which incomplete preference lists are allowed.
We next study the set of robust stable matchings for instance A under probability distribution p. We show that this set forms a sublattice of the lattice of stable matchings for A and we give an efficient algorithm for finding a succinct representation for this set. This representation has the property that any member of the set can be efficiently retrieved from it.
Our main theorem is the following.
Theorem 1.
Given an instance A of the stable matching problem, with possibly incomplete preference lists, and a probability distribution p over the domain D of errors defined above, there is an efficient algorithm that finds:
• A robust stable matching for A.
• 
Overview of results and technical ideas
Henceforth, we will assume that we are dealing with a stable matching instance with complete preference lists; we will finally generalize to incomplete lists in Section 4.1.
Let us first summarize some well-known structural facts, e.g., see [GI89] . The set of stable matchings of an instance form a distributive lattice: given two stable matchings M and M ′ , their meet and join involve taking, for each boy, the optimal or pessimal choice, respectively. It is easy to show that the resulting two matchings are also stable. The extreme matchings of this lattice are called boy optimal and girl-optimal matchings. A deep notion about this lattice is that of a rotation. A rotation, on an ordered list of k boy-girl pairs, when applied to a matching M in which all these boy-girl pairs are matched to each other, matches each boy to the next girl on the list, closing the list under rotation. The k pairs and the order among them are so chosen that the resulting matching is also stable; moreover, a rotation on a subset of these k pairs, under any ordering, leads to a matching that is not stable. Hence, a rotation can be viewed as a minimal change to the current matching that results in a stable matching. Rotations help traverse the lattice from the boy-optimal to the girl-optimal matching along all possible paths available.
Birkhoff's [B + 37] fundamental theorem for finite, distributive lattices shows that corresponding to each such lattice, L, there is a partial order, say Π, such that the closed sets of Π are isomorphic to the elements of Π. It turns out that for a lattice arising from a stable matching instance, the partial order Π is defined on a set, say R, of rotations. Moreover, if S is a closed set of Π, then starting in the lattice from the boy-optimal matching and applying the rotations in S in any order consistent with a topological sort of Π, we will reach the stable matching corresponding to S. Let Π A be the partial order for the lattice of instance A. It is easy to see that a matching M ∈ M A , corresponding to a closed set S of Π A , is in M B iff whenever ρ in ∈ S, ρ out ∈ S.
In Section 4 we give an integer program whose optimal solution is a robust stable matching for the given probability distribution on shifts. The IP has one indicator variable, y ρ , corresponding to each rotation ρ in Π A . The constraints of the program ensure that the set S of rotations that are set to 0 form a closed set. The rest of the constraints and the objective function ensure that the corresponding matching minimizes the probability that M is in M A \ M B . We obtain the LP-relaxation of this IP and then obtain the dual LP. We interpret the latter as solving a maximum circulation problem in a special network. This in turn is solvable as a max-flow problem on a network having O(n 2 ) vertices and the solution yields an integral optimal solution to the LP, hence yielding an efficient combinatorial algorithm for finding a robust stable matching.
In Section 5, we next study the set of robust stable matchings for instance A under probability distribution p. We show that this set forms a sublattice of the lattice of stable matchings for A (Lemma 13). We give an efficient algorithm for finding a succinct representation for this set. This representation has the property that any member of the set can be efficiently retrieved from it (Lemma 15).
Related work
Aziz. et. al.
[ABG + 16] considered the problem of finding stable matching under uncertain linear preferences. They proposed three different uncertainty models:
1. Lottery Model: Each agent has a probability distribution over strict preference lists, independent of other agents.
2. Compact Indifference Model: Each agent has a single weak preference list in which ties may exist. All linear order extensions of this weak order have equal probability.
3. Joint Probability Model: A probability distribution over preference profiles is specified.
They showed that finding the matching with highest probability of begin stable is NP-hard for the Compact Indifference Model and the Joint Probability Model. For the very special case that preference lists of one gender are certain and the number of uncertain agents of the other gender are bounded by a constant, they gave a polynomial time algorithm that works for all three models.
The joint probability model is the most powerful and closest to our setting. The main difference is that in their model, there is no base instance, called A in our model. The opportunity of finding new structural results arises from our model precisely because we need to consider two "nearby" instances, namely A and the instance B obtained by executing a shift.
[ABF + 17] introduced a pairwise probability model in which each agent gives the probability of preferring one agent over another for all possible pairs. They showed that the problem of finding a matching with highest probability of being stable is NP-hard even when no agent has a cycle in his/her certain preferences (i.e., the ones that hold with probability 1).
A matter of nomenclature
Assigning correct nomenclature to a new issue under investigation is clearly critical for ease of comprehension. In this context we wish to mention that very recently, Genc et. al. [GSOS17] defined the notion of an (a, b)-supermatch as follows: this is a stable matching in which if any a pairs break up, then it is possible to match them all off by changing the partners of at most b other pairs, so the resulting matching is also stable. They showed that it is NP-hard to decide if there is an (a, b)-supermatch. They also gave a polynomial time algorithm for a very restricted version of this problem, namely given a stable matching and a number b, decide if it is a (1, b)-supermatch.
Observe that since the given instance may have exponentially many stable matchings, this does not yield a polynomial time algorithm even for deciding if there is a stable matching which is a (1, b)-supermatch for a given b.
Genc. et. al.
[GSSO17] also went on to defining the notion of the most robust stable matching, namely a (1, b)-supermatch where b is minimum. We would like to point out that "robust" is a misnomer in this situation and that the name "fault-tolerant" is more appropriate. In the literature, the latter is used to describe a system which continues to operate even in the event of failures and the former is used to describe a system which is able to cope with erroneous inputs, e.g., see the following pages from Wikipedia [Wikb, Wika] .
Preliminaries

The stable matching problem
The stable matching problem with incomplete preference lists takes as input a set of n boys B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n } and a set of n girls G = {g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g n } and a bipartite graph G = (B, G, E), where E is a set of edges connecting certain boys to certain girls. Each agent v has a preference ranking the subset of opposite sex that are neighbors of v in G. If v cannot be paired to one of the neighbors, it prefers remaining unpaired rather than getting paired to any of the rest of the agents of opposite sex. The notation b i < g b j indicates that girl g strictly prefers b j to b i in her preference list. Similarly, g i < b g j indicates that the boy b strictly prefers g j to g i in his list.
A matching M is a pairing of boys and girls so it is a maximum matching in G. Thus, if G is the complete bipartite graph, M will be a perfect matching in it. For each pair bg ∈ M, b is called the partner of g in M (or M-partner), denoted by p M (g), and vice versa. For a matching M, a pair bg ∈ M is said to be blocking if b and g prefer each other to their partners in M; note that b and/or g need not be matched under M. Matching M is stable if there is no blocking pair w.r.t.
M.
As stated in Section 1.1, from here on we will assume that G is a complete bipartite graph. Finally, we will relax this assumption in Section 4 to derive the more general result.
The lattice of stable matchings
Let M and M ′ be two stable matchings. We say that M dominates M ′ , denoted by M M ′ , if every boy weakly prefers his partner in M to M ′ (he either has the same partner or prefers his partner in M to M ′ ). It is well known that the dominance partial order over the set of stable matchings forms a distributive lattice [GI89] , with meet and join defined as follows. The meet of M and M ′ , M ∧ M ′ , is defined to be the matching that results when each boy chooses his more preferred partner from M and M ′ ; it is easy to show that this matching is also stable. The join of M and M ′ , M ∨ M ′ , is defined to be the matching that results when each boy chooses his less preferred partner from M and M ′ ; this matching is also stable. These operations distribute, i.e., given three stable matchings
It is easy to see that the lattice must contain a matching, M 0 , that dominates all others and a matching M z that is dominated by all others. M 0 is called the boy-optimal matching, since in it, each boy is matched to his most favorite girl among all stable matchings. This is also the girl-pessimal matching. Similarly, M z is the boy-pessimal or girl-optimal matching.
Rotations help traverse the lattice
A crucial ingredient needed to understand the structure of stable matchings is the notion of a rotation, which was defined by Irving [Irv85] and studied in detail in [IL86] . A rotation takes r matched pairs in a fixed order, say {b 0 g 0 , b 1 g 1 , . . . , b r−1 g r−1 } and "cyclically" changes the mates of these 2r agents, as defined below, to arrive at another stable matching. Furthermore, it represents a minimal set of pairings with this property, i.e, if a cyclic change is applied on any subset of these r pairs, with any ordering, then the resulting matching has a blocking pair and is not stable. After rotation, the boys' mates weakly worsen and the girls' mates weakly improve. One can traverse from M 0 to M z by applying a suitable sequence of rotations, given by any topological sort of the rotation poset (defined below).
Let M be a stable matching. 
, where i + 1 is taken modulo r. In this paper, we assume that the subscript is taken modulo r whenever we mention a rotation. Notice that a rotation is cyclic and the sequence of pairs can be rotated. M/ρ is defined to be a matching in which each boy not in a pair of ρ stays matched to the same girl and each boy b i in ρ is matched to g i+1 = s M (b i ). It can be proven that M/ρ is also a stable matching. The transformation from M to M/ρ is called the elimination of ρ from M. 
The rotation poset
Let A be an instance of stable matching problem and let L A be the lattice of its stable matchings. Corresponding to lattice L A , there is a partial order Π such that the closed subsets of Π are in one-to-one correspondence with the matchings in L A ; a closed subset is a subset of the poset such that if an element is in the subset then all of its predecessors are also included. Since lattice L A arises from a stable matching instance, it turns out that Π is defined over a set of rotations. This partial order on rotations is called rotation poset. Given a closed subset C, the corresponding matching M is found by eliminating the rotations starting from M 0 according to the topological ordering of the elements in the subset. We say that C generates M. Proof. Since M ∈ M B , there must be a blocking pair xy ∈ M under B. Assume xy is not bg, we will show that xy must also be a blocking pair in A. Let y ′ be the partner of x and x ′ be the partner of y in M. Since xy is a blocking pair in B, x > B y x ′ and y > B x y ′ . The preference list of x remain unchanged from A to B, so y > A x y ′ . Next, we consider two cases: • If y is not g, the preference list of y does not change. Therefore, x > A y x ′ , and hence, xy is also a blocking pair in A.
• If y is g, for all pairs x, x ′ such that x > B y x ′ and x = b, we also have x > A y x ′ . Therefore, xy is a blocking pair in A. We will denote the lattice formed by M AB as L AB .
This contradicts the fact that M is stable under
Rotations going into and out of the sublattice L AB
Let M be a stable matching in M A and ρ be a rotation exposed in M with respect to instance A. If M ∈ S and M/ρ ∈ S for a set S of stable matchings, we say that ρ goes into S. Similarly, if M ∈ S and M/ρ ∈ S, we say that ρ goes out of S. Let the set of all rotations going into S and out of S be I S and O S , respectively. Proof. Assume that ρ 1 = ρ 2 and there exists a sequence of rotation eliminations, from M 0 to a stable matching M in which ρ 2 is exposed, that does not contain ρ 1 . Since ρ 2 moves b below g, g is matched a partner higher than b in her list in M/ρ 2 . Therefore, the partner can only be b i l or a boy higher than b i l in g's list.
Consider any sequence of rotation eliminations from M/ρ to M z . In the sequence, the position of g's partner can only go higher in her list. Therefore, ρ 1 cannot be exposed in any matching in the sequence. It follows that ρ 1 is not exposed in a sequence of eliminations from M 0 to M z , which is a contradiction by Lemma 3. Proof. By Lemma 6, I M AB can contain at most 2 rotations, namely ρ 1 and ρ 2 if they are distinct. By Lemma 7, if both of them exist, ρ 1 ρ 2 . Hence, I M AB can contain at most one rotation, and it is either ρ 1 or ρ 2 .
Again, by Lemma 6, O M AB can contain at most one rotation, namely ρ 3 if it exists.
By Theorem 3, there is at most one rotation ρ in coming into M AB and at most one rotation ρ out coming out of M AB .
Proposition 4. ρ in and ρ out can be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. Since we can compute Π A efficiently according to Lemma 2, each of ρ 1 , ρ 2 and ρ 3 can be computed efficiently. 
The rotation poset for the sublattice L AB
From the previous section we know that L AB is a sublattice of L A . In this section we give the rotation poset that generates all stable matchings in this sublattice.
We may assume that M AB = ∅. If ρ in exists, let Π in = {ρ ∈ Π A : ρ ρ in } and M boy be the matching generated by Π in . Otherwise, let M boy = M 0 . Similarly, let M girl be the matching generated by Π A \ Π out , where Π out = {ρ ∈ Π A : ρ ρ out }, if ρ out exists, and M girl = M z otherwise.
Lemma 9. M boy is the boy-optimal matching in M AB , and M girl is the girl-optimal matching in M AB .
Proof. Let M be a matching in M AB generated by a closed subset S ⊆ Π A . By Lemma 8, if ρ in exists, S must contain ρ in . Since Π in is the minimum set containing ρ in , Π in ⊆ S. Therefore, M boy M.
To prove that M M girl , we show S ⊆ Π A \ Π out . Assume otherwise, then there exists a rotation ρ ∈ S such that ρ ∈ Π A \ Π out . It follows that ρ ∈ Π out , and hence ρ ρ out . Since S contains ρ and S is a closed subset, S must also contain ρ out . This is a contradiction by Lemma 8.
Proof. Let M be a matching in M AB generated by a closed subset S ⊆ Π A . Let S ′ = S \ Π in . We show that S ′ is a closed subset of Π AB and eliminating the rotations in S ′ starting from M boy according to the topological ordering of the elements gives M.
First S ′ ∩ Π in = ∅ trivially. Since M ∈ M AB , S does not contain ρ out by Lemma 8. Therefore, S ′ does not contain ρ out , and S ′ ∩ Π out = ∅. It follows that S ′ is a closed subset of Π AB .
Next observe that we can eliminate rotations in S from M 0 by eliminating rotations in Π in first and then eliminating rotations in S \ Π in . This can be done because Π in is a closed subset of Π A . Since Π in generates M, the lemma follows.
Finally, we observe that the results stated above also follow when we make an upward shift in a boy's list. 
Efficient Algorithm for Finding a Robust Stable Matching
As stated in Section 1, let D be the domain of all possible shifts applied to each boy's list and each girl's list in instance A and let p be a discrete probability distribution on D. Pick one shift from D under p and let C be the random variable denoting the resulting instance. As defined in Section 1, a robust stable matching is a stable matching M ∈ M A that minimizes the probability that M ∈ M AC . 
(IP)
Lemma 11. An optimal solution to (IP) gives a robust stable matching.
Proof. Let S = {ρ : y v = 0}. The set of constraints:
guarantees that S is a closed subset.
Notice that 
Define f uv , f st and g uv to be the dual variables corresponding to the first three constraints of (LP). Then its dual is:
We will interpret (DP) as solving a maximum circulation problem in the following network N: It has three sets of edges, {(s, t)}, E(H) and F. The edges in E(H) are of infinite capacity and the flow on e ∈ E(H) is denoted by f e . F contains edges with capacity p, and the flow on e ∈ F is denoted by g e . The goal is to push the maximum amount of flow from t to s through E(H) ∪ F and then back from s to t on edge (s, t) of infinite capacity.
Lemma 12. (LP) always has an integral optimal solution and there is a combinatorial polynomial time algorithm for solving it.
Proof. First, remove edge st from the above described network and find a maximum flow from t to s and denote it by f , g. Obtain the residual graph, which clearly will not have any paths from t to s. Let R be the set of vertices reachable from t using residual edges. Construct (x, y) as follows:
Clearly, (x, y) is integral. Moreover, (x, y) and (f , g) satisfy complementarity:
• f uv (y u − y v ) = 0 for all (u, v) ∈ E(H).
•
Hence, (x, y) is an integral optimal solution for (LP).
Remark. Notice that we formulated the IP for robust stable matching as a minimization problem, i.e, minimizing the probability that the matching M is in M AB . Remark. We can now explain why downward shifts are much more difficult to deal with. Observe that the guarantee that there is at most one rotation, ρ in , that leads from M A ∩ M B to M AB and at most one rotation, ρ out that leads from M AB to M A ∩ M B is crucial for forming the IP and showing that its LP-relaxation always has integral an integral solution. For the case of downward shifts, there may be more than one rotation that lead from M A ∩ M B to M AB and from M AB to M A ∩ M B . Although we can still formulate an IP for this case, its LP-relaxation is not guaranteed to have an integral solution.
Extending to incomplete preference lists
Finally, we show how to extend our algorithm to the generalization of stable matching to incomplete preference lists. It is well known that the set of unmatched agents remain unchanged under all stable matchings in this case, e.g., see [GI89] . Let A be the given instance and let B be obtained by executing an upward shift on one agent's list. If the set of unmatched agents under B is not the same as under A, then M A ∩ M B = ∅ and we can ignore B. Otherwise, the sets of stable matchings in A and B are defined over the same subset of the agents and all our results carry over.
The first part of Theorem 1 now follows from Lemmas 11 and 12.
Succinct Representation for the Sublattice of Robust Stable Matchings
We first prove that the set of robust stable matchings forms a sublattice of the lattice of all stable matchings of the given instance. We then use our combinatorial solution of (DP) to show how to obtain a succinct structure that helps generate all matchings from this sublattice.
Lemma 13. The set of robust stable matchings to instance A under probability distribution p forms a sublattice of L A .
Proof. Let M 1 and M 2 be two robust stable matchings and let S 1 and S 2 be the corresponding closed subsets. It suffices to show that the matchings generated by S 1 ∪ S 2 and S 2 ∩ S 2 are also robust. We say that a closed subset S separates and edge (ρ B out , ρ B in ) in E if ρ B out ∈ S and ρ B in ∈ S. Divide the edges in F into 5 sets as follows:
2. F 2 is the set of edges in F from S 1 \ S 2 to S 1 ∩ S 2 .
3. F 3 is the set of edges in F from S 2 \ S 1 to S 1 ∩ S 2 . Therefore,
F 4 is the set of edges in F from
We will show that P 2 = P 4 and P 3 = P 5 . Assume without loss of generality that P 2 > P 4 and P 3 > P 5 . Then
In other words, the objective of (IP) obtained by S 1 ∩ S 2 is smaller than the one obtained by S 1 . This contradicts the fact that M 1 is robust stable matching. Therefore, P 2 = P 4 and P 3 = P 5 as desired.
It follows that P 1 + P 2 + P 3 and P 1 + P 4 + P 5 also attain the minimum value of the objective function of (IP). Hence, the matchings generated by S 1 ∪ S 2 and S 2 ∩ S 2 are also robust.
By Lemma 13, the set of robust stable matchings is a sublattice, say L 0 , of L A . By Birkhoff's Theorem [B + 37] we know that there is a partial order, say Π 0 , whose closed sets are isomorphic to L 0 . Next, we show how to construct Π 0 using our combinatorial solution for (DP).
As in Lemma 12, remove edge st from network N described above and find a maximum flow from t to s and denote it by f , g. Obtain the residual graph, say G. The strongly connected components of G are the elements of Π 0 . Contracting the strongly connected components of G yields a DAG D, which gives the precedence relations in Π 0 . To be precise, x ≺ y in Π 0 if and only if there is a path from x to y in D.
Lemma 14. The closed sets of partial order Π 0 correspond exactly to robust stable matchings.
Proof. Let S be a closed set in Π 0 . There are no edges in the residual graph that go from S to S. Hence all edges in the cut (S, S) are fully saturated and therefore this cut minimizes the objective function of (IP). Hence the corresponding matching is a robust stable matching. The reverse direction is straightforward.
Recall that if Π is the rotation poset for lattice L A , then the matching corresponding to any closed set S in Π is obtained by starting from the boy-optimal matching in L A and applying all rotations in S in any order consistent with a topological sort of Π. In [MV18] we show that the corresponding process for finding the matching in L 0 corresponding to a closed set S of Π 0 is the following: The elements of S are sets of rotations. Let U be the union of all these sets. Now starting from the boy-optimal matching in L A , apply all rotations in U in any order consistent with a topological sort of Π. This yields the matching in L 0 corresponding to set S. Hence we get.
Lemma 15. Π 0 generates the sublattice L 0 of robust stable matchings.
The second part of Theorem 1 follows from Lemmas 13 and 15.
Discussion
As stated in the Introduction, the two main questions on stable matching considered in this paper are obtaining efficient algorithms for finding solutions that are robust to errors in the input, and the structural question of finding relationships between the lattices of solutions of two "nearby" instances. The current paper and our followup work [MV18] seem to suggest that both these issues are likely to lead to much work in the future. In particular, the structural results are so clean and extensive that they are likely to find algorithmic applications beyond the problem of finding robust solutions. One possible domain of applications that may be able to exploit these structural properties is matching-based markets, particularly as we are seeing ever more interesting such markets being designed and launched on the Internet, e.g., see [Rot16] .
At a more detailed level, we have left the open problem of dealing with downward shifts. The domain D, for which we have obtained our algorithm, is very restrictive and we need to extend it to a larger domain. Our followup paper [MV18] partially does this, though it works with a weaker notion of "robust". It seems more should be doable; in particular, what happens if two or more errors are introduced simultaneously?
Beyond these questions, pertaining to the most basic of formulations of stable matching, one can study numerous variants and generalizations, e.g., the stable roommates problem, and matching intern couples to hospitals. Each of these bring their own structural properties and challenges, e.g., see [GI89, Man13] .
